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Crisis of the “Nehruvian Consensus”
or Pluralization of Indian Politics?
Aligarh Muslim University and the
Demand for Minority Status
Laurence Gautier
1 Away from Aligarh’s bustling old city, across the railway track which divides the city
into “two adjacent towns” (Mann 1992:28), lies the sprawling campus of Aligarh Muslim
University (AMU). Bab-e-Syed, a grand gate made of sandstone and marble, acts as the
visible frontier between the outside world and the venerable institution. Inside, the
sherwanis that some students wear and the cusped arches and domes of older buildings
give the campus a distinct mahaul (atmosphere) that further marks it out from the rest
of the city.
2 Although  AMU  occupies  a  separate,  somehow  peripheral  space  in  Aligarh  city,  it
remains for many a central  symbol of  Muslims’  tahzeeb (culture)  and socio-political
status in India. From the very outset, Aligarh’s founders projected their college—then
known as the Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College—as an all-India Muslim institution.
Sir Syed1 and his colleagues claimed to serve the interests of all Indian Muslims, even
though  in  practice  they  mostly  addressed  North  Indian  ashraf2 elites.  After
independence, many Aligarhians continued to see their alma mater as a source of pride
for the community. To them, it epitomized Sir Syed’s efforts to uplift Muslims and to
preserve the legacy of the glorious Mughal past. By contrast, many outsiders regarded
the institution with suspicion. Due to students and teachers’  widespread support to
Muslim League in the 1940s, AMU became a lieu de mémoire (memorial site) of partition
and a symbol of so-called Muslim separatism (Brass 200. In either case, AMU was more
than an educational institution. To its supporters and detractors alike, it appeared as a
symbol of Muslims’ position in India before and after independence.
3 AMU  therefore  occupies  a  very  special  position  in  the  Indian  public  sphere.  It  is
simultaneously a central university, under control of the central government, and the
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Muslim  institution  par  excellence,  supposed  to  serve  and  represent  the  Muslim
community. As such, it draws the attention of a wide range of actors, much beyond the
campus’s  premises—government,  politicians  and  religious  organizations—for  whom
AMU constitutes a privileged platform to address the community. At the same time,
AMU is no mere symbol to be easily appropriated by outsiders. As a university, it is a
place of vibrant debates among students, teachers and administrators, who need not
share the same vision of the University’s role and character.
4 In this article, I explore the dual nature of AMU as a Muslim symbol and as a site of
contentious  politics.  I  focus  in  particular  on  the  campaign  for  AMU’s  minority
status (1965–1981) and its impact on Indian politics in the post-Nehruvian period. What
started  in  1965  as  an  internal  university  dispute  soon  transformed  into  a  central
Muslim issue. The campaign revived AMU’s role as a key site of Indian Muslim politics,
as  the  minority  status  question  crystallized  mounting  resentment  against  the
government  and  provided  a  common  platform  to  heterogeneous  forces—students,
teachers, as well as Muslim organizations—who all claimed to serve Muslim interests.
5 Historian  Mushirul  Hasan  regards  the  campaign  for  Aligarh’s  minority  status  as  a
symptom  of  the  “sectarian  passions”  which  eroded,  from  the  1960s  onwards,  the
Nehruvian “consensus” based on the idea of a secular, composite and democratic India
(1997:258–61, 276). Like him, other scholars interpret the post-Nehruvian period as one
of “crisis,” epitomized by the Emergency, the rise of communal violence and finally the
coming to power of the Hindu right in the 1990s. Sunil Khilnani, for instance, contrasts
Nehru’s supposed achievements—the establishment of a strong state and a stable social
order—with  the  rise  of  political  competition  and  the emergence  of  group-based
demands in  the latter  period.  He argues  that  this  political  competition encouraged
politicians  to  resort, increasingly,  to  identity  politics  in  order  to  mobilize  their
electorates. For him, this process of identity creation was dangerous as it often led to
conflict  rather  than  competition,  thereby  corrupting  democratic  principles
(Khilnani 1997).
6 Yet one need not interpret the emergence of new political  formations representing
group-based interests simply as a source of sectarianism. Jaffrelot (2003) has argued
persuasively that the political mobilization of the lower castes from the 1960s onwards
marked the beginning of a “silent revolution,” which allowed the progressive transfer
of power from a small upper-caste minority to much larger subaltern groups. Just as
revisionist historians have emphasized the contingent character of partition thereby
challenging a teleological interpretation of the late colonial period through partition’s
lens, it seems important to stop reading the post-Nehruvian period merely as a period
of crisis,  or as part of a sequence, leading inevitably to the explosion of communal
violence and to the rise of Hindutva in the 1990s (Jalal 1994). Instead, one might read it
as a period of pluralization of Indian political life, marked by the formation of political
groups defending group-based interests.
7 With  this  goal  in  mind,  in  this  article  I  highlight  the  role  of  university  politics,
particularly at AMU, in the emergence of contentious voices challenging the so-called
“Nehruvian consensus” from the 1960s onwards.  I  argue that the Aligarh campaign
played a key role in re-shaping the contours of Muslim politics after independence; it
contributed to the re-emergence of the demand for Muslim minority rights,  largely
delegitimized  after  partition;  it  provided  a  platform  for  an  increasingly  assertive
Muslim leadership which claimed to represent the so-called “Muslim community”; it
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constituted a laboratory for issue-based coalitions, which, in the absence of a strong
Muslim political  party,  became a dominant feature of  Muslim politics,  especially  in
North India. By putting forward the demand for minority status,3 the Aligarh campaign
challenged Congress’s “hegemonic” discourse on secular nationalism (Bajpai 2011:168).
As  such,  it  participated  in  the  larger  pluralization  of  Indian  politics  in  the  1960s,
marked  by  the  erosion  of  Congress’s  dominance,  much  before  the  post-Emergency
crisis.4
 
From a University Controversy to a Muslim Issue 
8 How did the question of AMU’s minority status first arise? In Muslim Political Discourse in
Postcolonial  India,  Hilal  Ahmed (2014) insists  on the fact  that there is  no monolithic
Muslim politics, nor set packages of Muslim issues. He shows how specific objects—in
his  case,  Indo-Islamic  monuments—can  be  transformed  into  Muslim  issues and
appropriated to justify the existence of a single Muslim community. In a similar way, in
the first part of this article, I will show how a university matter—a controversy over
quotas for internal students—became a Muslim minority issue.
9 After partition, Nehru and his Education Minister, Maulana Azad, decided to grant AMU
the central university status. I have argued elsewhere that this decision reflected Nehru
and  Azad’s  efforts  to  transform  the  erstwhile  “arsenal  of  Muslim  India”
(Abbas 2012:68)5 into  a  symbol  and  an  instrument  of  national  integration
(Gautier 2016). Despite AMU’s association with the Muslim League in the 1940s, after
partition, Nehru and Azad did not seek to punish the institution. Instead, they aimed to
clear its Muslim League legacy so that it could become a national institution. To fulfil
this objective, Nehru and Azad appointed Zakir Husain, known for his commitment to
Congress’s one-nation policy, at the head of the institution. In Husain’s words, Aligarh’s
new objective was to “revive hope and faith” among the “despondent Muslim masses
scattered all  over the country.” (NAI, ME, File 41–90/50-D.3,  1950).  By transforming
AMU into a national institution, symbolic of composite India, Nehru, Azad and Husain
hoped to rally Muslim citizens battered by partition to “an integrated nationhood in a
secular democratic state” (NAI, ME, 41–90/50-D.3, 1950).
10 Large sections of the student and teacher body supported this national re-orientation,
especially those associated with the Left. Others, however, feared that such reforms,
combined with government interference, would erode Aligarh’s Muslim character. This
was the case of Hameed-ud-Din Khan ([1966]2006), a professor of Persian, who argued
that  a  “considerable  number”  of  progressives  had  been  “imported”  from  other
universities “as an antidote to any lingering Muslim League infection” in AMU’s body
(p. 92). Khan added: “Some non-Muslims of known anti-Muslim bias were also brought
in  and  installed  as  Heads  of  Departments”  (p.93).  To  him,  this  recruitment  policy
reflected the government’s attempts to carry out the shuddhi (Hindu purification) of the
institution, therefore threatening the Muslim character of the University.
11 The  majoritarian  policies  of  the  Uttar  Pradesh  (UP)  government  heightened  these
apprehensions. Their imposition of Hindi as the sole official state language and their
efforts to reform the Muslim Personal Law appeared to many UP Muslims as an attempt
to impose a uniform Hindu culture (Hasan 1997; Brass 1974). These anti-Muslim moves
contributed to a volatile atmosphere on campus. In 1961, a dispute between Hindu and
Muslim students  sparked the worst  communal  riots  in  Aligarh since Independence.
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State authorities quickly laid the blame on AMU students, ignoring the role played by
the RSS and the Jana Sangh (Brass 2011:176–80; Pandit 2014:110–22). The government’s
biased reaction reinforced among large sections of  Aligarh’s  Muslim population the
feeling that state authorities were either unable or unwilling to protect them and to
treat them fairly.
12 In response, many Muslim residents chose to vote during the 1962 elections for the
Dalit-based  Republican  Party  of  India,  instead  of  Congress.  AMU  faculty  played  a
decisive  role  in  this  Dalit-Muslim  alliance.  Abdul  Bashir  Khan,  AMU’s  Proctor,  and
Ravind Khwaja, who taught medicine at the University, joined hands with B.P. Maurya,
the local leader of the Republican Party of India (RPI),6 himself a Law professor at AMU,
to  beat  Congress  in  the  Assembly  and  Lok  Sabha  elections  (Jaffrelot 2003:106–07;
Duncan 1979:275–93). Although this Dalit-Muslim alliance did not last long, it had an
enduring impact. First, it put an end to Congress’s power in Aligarh’s district. Second, it
showed that Congress could no longer take Muslim voters for granted. If neglected,
they could ally with another minority—in this case the Scheduled Castes—to challenge
the party’s dominance, thereby opening the way to a pluralization of political forces in
the former Congress “heartland” (Kudaisya 2006).
13 It is in this climate of mounting tensions between Congress and UP Muslims, palpable
at AMU, that the question of Aligarh’s minority status arose. What was to become a
major Muslim issue first started as an internal controversy over a university matter—
student  quotas.  This  controversy  reflected  internal  debates  over  AMU’s  Muslim
character as well as students’ concerns over their professional future. Indeed, for many
University members, the composition of AMU’s student population constituted a more
essential element of Aligarh’s Muslim character than its curriculum. These students
and teachers considered that AMU’s resources should remain in the hands of Muslims
and should primarily benefit Muslim students (AMU 1961:116, 139).
14 This concern over access to AMU’s resources became particularly acute at a time when
the  high  levels  of  graduate  unemployment  generated  widespread  anxiety  among
students. Graduate unemployment had been a long-standing problem, which was not
restricted to Muslim students. Already in 1935, the Sapru Committee had expressed
concerns about the “alarming” extent of unemployment among University graduates
(India 1944:28). In 1966, once again, the Kothari Commission stressed the “large rate of
under-employment or unemployment, particularly among the educated” (India 1966:2).
15 In some ways,  thus,  the situation of  students at  Aligarh was comparable to that  of
students in other universities.  Yet,  at  AMU, it  crystallized among students a strong
sense of being discriminated against as Muslims. Badruddin Tyabji (1994), AMU’s Vice-
Chancellor  in  the  early  1960s,  himself  believed  that  there  was  a  “prejudice  that
prevailed in employment circles against students who had passed out from Aligarh,” a
prejudice  derived,  he  argued,  from  AMU’s  reputation  “as  a  hotbed  of  Muslim
reaction...more  or  less  linked  with  Pakistan”  (p.146).  To  address  students’
apprehensions, he proposed to raise the proportion of internal students7 from 50% to
75% in the Engineering and Medical Colleges, two of the most sought-after departments
at AMU where about half of the students were non-Muslims (Tyabji 1958:3). Given the
fact that most of AMU’s internal students were Muslim, this measure would help secure
a  higher  proportion of  Muslim students  in  these  departments  without  resorting  to
religion-based  quotas8 deemed  more  controversial. 9 Through  this  measure, Tyabji
(1994)  thus  hoped  to  address  two  problems  at  once:  to  provide  his  students  with
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promising  job  prospects  and  to reassure  those  who  feared  that  AMU  may  lose  its
Muslim character (pp.165–6).
16 Unsurprisingly, the decision of his successor, Ali Yavar Jung, to bring internal quotas
back to 50% had exactly the opposite effect. The announcement of this decision in April
1965 sparked a series of protests, one of which degenerated into a violent attack against
the  Vice-Chancellor.  Violent  protests  were  not  completely  unusual  in  Indian
universities.10 State administrators usually interpreted them as symptoms of students’
indiscipline (India 1960; Kabir 1955). Yet, in AMU’s case, the Education Minister M.C.
Chagla, quickly lent an ideological dimension to the incident. He projected students’
agitation as a battle between communal and secular forces (NMML, 80, 1965).11 A few
days after the attack, he demanded the closure of the University and the adoption of an
ordinance  which  reinforced  the  control  of  the  government  over  the  institution.
According  to  him,  these  “drastic  measures”  were  required  to  “eliminate  a  small,
fanatic,  obscurantist  and reactionary section in the University” who threatened the
national  and  secular  character  of  the  institution  (Chagla 1974:380).  Chagla’s  drastic
measures,  far  from  settling  the  issue,  sparked  a  new  series  of  protests  inside  the
University. The government deployed the police on campus and several students and
members of  the administrative bodies,  said to have encouraged the agitation,  were
arrested.12 In response, members of the Students’ Union formed an Action Committee
to lead the protests  against  quota reforms and against  the government’s  ordinance
(NMML, 90, 1965).13
17 This campaign, which now involved students as well as teachers and staff members,
revived earlier  political  and factional  divisions  between “reformists,”  who,  like  the
Vice-Chancellor, supported the re-orientation of the University, and “conservatives,”
keen  to  preserve  AMU’s  Muslim  character.  Thus,  while  Jung (1983)  warned  his
colleagues against the “creation of citadels or pockets of communal exclusivism” (pp.
229–30).14 The Pro-Vice-Chancellor argued that Aligarh’s mission was primarily to train
Muslim students in accordance to “Islamic culture” (Islami  tahzeeb)  and “traditions”
(Islami  rivayat)  (Khan 1969:459–60).  As  a  result,  the  agitation  against  the  reform  of
internal quotas—which was primarily a student issue—soon transformed into a battle
over the character of the University. For rival factions inside the institution, it became
a  fight  either  between  secular  and  communal  forces,  or  between  supporters  and
opponents of Aligarh’s Muslim character.
18 The university agitation reached a new dimension when Muslim organizations joined
the protestors’ ranks. The agitation started barely one year after the establishment of
Majlis-e-Mushawarat, a new coalition of Muslim religious and political organizations
which aimed to represent Muslim interests at pan-Indian level. The formation of this
association  represented  a  significant shift  in  Muslim  politics.  After  partition,  large
numbers  of  Muslims  preferred  to  contain  the  markers  of  their  difference  to  avoid
further  stigmatization  and  violence  (Sherman 2015).  In  UP,  leaders  of  the  Muslim
League,  deemed  responsible  for  Muslim  separatism,  decided  to  dissolve  their
organization, thereby “dismantling the former Muslim heartland” (Kudaisya 2006:359–
66).  Meanwhile,  Congress  Muslim  leaders,  particularly  Maulana  Azad,  urged  Indian
Muslims to turn away from communal organizations to join Congress.
19 It is only in the early 1960s that some Muslim groups or individuals began to set up
distinct platforms to represent Muslim interests. These initiatives responded in large
measure  to  the  resurgence  of  communal  violence  in  different  parts  of  India.  In
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February 1961, the eruption of communal riots in Jabalpur marked a turning point after
a decade of relative calm (Graff and Galonnier 2013:10).  Syed Mahmud ([1964] 1974),
long-serving secretary of the Congress party and a close friend of Nehru, called an all-
India  Muslim  convention  to  urge  the  government  to  implement  a  “just”  political
system that would acknowledge the “rightful” position of Muslim citizens (Pp. 326–9).15
Three years  later,  after  a  new wave of  communal  riots,  Muslim organizations  with
widely divergent views came together to establish the Majlis-e-Mushawarat.
20 The formation of this body marked a rapprochement between Jamiat Ulama, Congress’s
ally,16 with its former arch-rival, the Muslim League. It also allowed Jamaat-e-Islami, 17
until then a marginal organization opposed to secular democratic principles, to gain
greater visibility and legitimacy thanks to their alliance with more mainstream bodies
(Quraishi 1971; Ahmad 2010:198–200). Together, these otherwise very different groups
aimed to form a common platform able to defend Muslim interests, thus pointing to
government’s failure, or even unwillingness, to protect its Muslim citizens.
21 Majlis leaders soon joined the Aligarh agitation. They transformed the university issue
into  a  Muslim issue,  of  relevance  to  all  Muslim citizens,  much beyond the  campus
premises. In July 1965, they organized a day of prayer to advertize their position on
AMU. A resolution was read out in mosques all over North India. Majlis urged their
audience to send telegrams to the President, the Prime Minister and the Home Minister
in  order  to  press  their  demand for  the  withdrawal of  the  government’s  ordinance
(NMML, 81, 1965).18 Around the same time, they organized, along with Aligarh’s “Old
Boys”  (alumni),  a  well-publicized  convention  in  Lucknow  to  protest  against  the
government’s  ordinance  (NMML,  90  and  81,  1965).19 These  events  met  with  a
widespread echo in the Hindi, English and Urdu press, in UP as well as in other parts of
India. Newspapers based not only in Delhi, Lucknow and Patna, but also in Calcutta,
Kerala, Hyderabad and Bombay, published reports on Majlis’s meetings and on the AMU
Action  Committee.20 The  campaign  thus  revived  AMU’s  value  as  a  Muslim  symbol,
anchored in  UP,  yet  resonating in  other  parts  of  India.  As  such,  it  provided Majlis
leaders with a privileged platform to project themselves as all-India Muslim leaders.
22 While the students’  agitation had started as a  purely internal  controversy over the
reduction of internal quotas, Majlis members gave a new orientation to the Aligarh
campaign. At the Lucknow Convention of August 1965, they argued that the control of
Aligarh’s administration should rest exclusively in Muslim hands. To justify this, they
invoked the constitutional right of religious minorities to “establish and administer the
educational  institutions  of  their  choice”  (NMML,  90,  1965).21 Here,  then,  was  the
demand for  minority  status  articulated  clearly  for  the  first  time.  Beyond students’
demand to  secure  a  high proportion of  seats  for  Muslim students,  Majlis  members
aimed  to  secure,  through  this  minority  status,  an  overall  Muslim  control  of  the
institution.
23 This  invocation  of  Muslims’  minority  rights  represented  a  significant  breach  in
Congress’s  “hegemonic”  discourse  on  secular  nationalism.  After  partition,  this
discourse, which prioritized national unity, had largely delegitimized religious groups’
minority demands, cast as communal. This can explain why in the 1950s large-scale
campaigns  for  the  recognition  of  Urdu were  framed in  terms  of  linguistic  minority
rights,  not  in  terms  of  Muslim rights  (Brass 1974).  By  contrast,  in  1965,  Majlis’s
convention  clearly  projected  the  demand  for  AMU’s  minority  status  as  a  Muslim
demand. In so doing, Majlis’s leaders distanced themselves from the dominant rhetoric
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on national unity to project Muslims as a minority group, in need of special rights and
protection.
24 Majlis further insisted on the religious character of AMU, an element which was absent
from students’ earlier demands. In June 1965, they adopted a resolution which stated
that “special facilities should be continued for the religio-moral instruction of students,
as well as for the teaching of theology, Islamic Studies, Arabic, Persian and Urdu.” They
added: “special facilities should be provided for the performance of religious duties”
and  the  University  “should  be  saved  from  the  anti-God  elements  which  are  today
dominating  its  affairs”  (Wright 1966a).22 These  demands  and  formulations  reflected
Jamaat-e-Islami’s powerful influence inside Majlis-e-Mushawarat (NMML, 90,  1965).23
For Jamaat members, the main objective was not simply to gain greater control over
the  institution.  They  aimed  to  transform  the  University,  earlier  denounced  as  a
“slaughter-house” (Ahmad 2010:124–5), into an institution faithful to their conception
of Islam. The AMU campaign thus provided them with an opportunity to advance their
own conception of Muslim identity, framed primarily in religious terms, as well as their
own conception of AMU’s Muslim character, defined in a combative fashion so as to
exclude “anti-God” elements from the Muslim institution.
25 Jamaat-e-Islami’s  forceful  intervention  in  the  Aligarh  campaign  prompted  Jamiat
Ulama, Congress’s  long-term ally,  often considered as Muslims’  main representative
body after partition, to play a more assertive stance vis-à-vis the government. In June
1965, soon after the beginning of the Aligarh agitation, the organization filed a case
against  the  government’s  ordinance.  The  Jamaat-led  Majlis  denounced  this
independent initiative. In response, Jamiat Ulama accused its “enviers,” i.e. the Jamaat,
of  sowing  division  among  Muslims.  According  to  a  pamphlet  published  by  Jamiat
Ulama: “The enviers (haasiden) of the Jamiat Ulema and the divisive elements (tafriqa
anasir) will try to ignite (bhadkana) [fears among] innocent-minded (sadah loh) Muslims”
and “spread anxiety” (bad dili phelana) while speaking in the name of “the unity of the
millat” (community) (Qasmi 1965:14).
26 Jamiat Ulama members projected themselves as the sole true representatives of Muslim
interests, “[leading] alone the battle to protect the fundamental rights (bunyadi huquq)
of Muslims in India after the revolution (inqilab) of 1947 and [putting] their lives at
stake to protect  Muslims from the catastrophic (qayamat  khaiz)  effects  of  partition”
(Qasmi 1965:4). Paradoxically, these bitter rivalries reinforced the notion of an all-India
Muslim  community.  Even  as  they  attacked  each  other,  Jamaat-e-Islami  and  Jamiat
Ulema members did so to claim leadership over a single Muslim community. Through
their competing publications, pamphlets and speeches, they gave wider currency to the
notion of an all-India Muslim community, with shared rights and interests.
27 The  Aligarh  campaign  therefore  crystallized  the  rise  of  a  Muslim politics  centered
around  the  defense  of  minority  rights,  which  had  been  largely  delegitimized  after
partition. It encouraged the emergence of a more assertive Muslim leadership at a time
when Muslim organizations sought to establish a structure independent of government
to represent the interests of the community. Despite a few dissonant voices within the
University (NMML, 90, 1965),24 the campaign garnered widespread support within and
outside  campus.  In  fact,  it  seems that  the  government’s  repeated  refusals  to  grant
Aligarh minority status added momentum to the campaign. The failure of the new AMU
Act (1972) to recognize AMU’s minority status thus sparked a new upsurge of students’
mobilization in 1972–1973.25 Again,  from 1977 to 1981,  Janata’s  and then Congress’s
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constantly delayed promises to grant AMU the minority status kept students and other
campaigners on tenterhooks.26 For many Muslims, Aligarh had become the symbol of
their  fight  against  state  discrimination and for  the recognition of  their  rights  as  a
minority.
28 The demand for Aligarh’s minority status directly challenged Congress’s discourse on
secular  nationalism,  which  prioritized  national  unity  over  group  rights.  As  Partha
Chatterjee  and  Aditya  Nigam  have  suggested,  the  secular  nationalist  discourse
remained dominant until the 1980s in civil society, i.e. in the sphere of modern civil
institutions, but it did not have the same hegemonic position in political society, i.e. in
the “domain of daily negotiations” between the population and the state,27 even before
the  Emergency.  At  AMU,  the  actors  of  the  minority  status  campaign  found  in  the
language of minority rights the legitimizing framework to express their grievances,
demand access to educational resources and seek protection from an unreliable state,
deeply suspect of majoritarianism. In so doing, they contributed to reinforcing the idea
that Muslim citizens were minority citizens, whose rights and interests were mediated
by their belonging to a single Muslim community.
 
The Role of Student Politics in the Pluralization of
Indian Politics
29 This reconfiguration of Muslim politics,  visible at AMU, should be seen as part of a
larger pluralization of Indian politics in the post-Nehruvian era. What characterized
this period, beside the rise of oppositional parties,  was the emergence of non-party
actors,  who  played  an  important  part  in  the  erosion  of  the  so-called  “Nehruvian
consensus.” As sites of “contentious politics” (Tilly and Tarrow 2015), universities like
AMU  participated  in  this  evolution:  they  facilitated  the  emergence  of  counter-
narratives as well as alternative sources of representation. At AMU, the campaign for
Aligarh’s minority status crystallized the rise of the minority rights counter-narrative.
But in the absence of a strong Muslim political party, it also served as a laboratory for
alternative forms of mobilization—student politics and issue-based coalitions.
30 First,  the campaign allowed AMU students to emerge as a significant political  force
within and beyond the premises of the University campus. AMU students embraced
vigorously the idea that they had a special responsibility in the defense of Muslims’
rights  and  interests.  As  members  of  this  iconic  institution,  Aligarh  students  were,
according to former Aligarh Muslim University Students’ Union President (AMUSU) Ali
Amir, “answerable for their thoughts and actions in front of the whole millat and in
front of the whole world” (AMUSU 1982:3–4).
31 During the campaign, students established enduring, if sometimes tense, connections
with  Muslim organizations and political  parties.  One  former  student,  Iftikhar  Alam
Khan, recalls that the building of the Old Boys’ Association28 on campus served as a
meeting point between students and other members of the Action Committee. The Old
Boys’  Association organized meetings  for  the defense of  AMU status  to  which they
invited  students  as  well as  campaigners  from  outside  the  University  (I.  A.  Khan
personal communication, March 18, 2015).
32 Relations based on mutual help sometimes flourished with specific Muslim leaders. Ali
Amir thus recalls that:
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Faridi sahab [Dr. A.J. Faridi, leader of the Muslim Majlis in UP] was supported
by the Students’ Union leaders… [They] went to his constituencies. [They]
provided support to his candidates, all of them. In return, he argued, “[they]
only had one demand for him – the support with the minority character
movement” (A. Amir, personal communication. March 13, 2014).
Akhtarul Wasey, another student leader, further speaks of a “joint venture” between
students and other supporters of the minority status:
The Students’ Union, the Students’ Action Committee, and Old Boys… at that
time there was no difference, almost all differences were melted down…All
Muslim groups and anti-Congress groups were supporting [students] (Wasey,
personal communication, November 7, 2013).
Arif Mohammad Khan, who presided over the Students’ Union in 1973–1974, presents a
slightly  different  picture,  underlining  a  degree  of  distance  between  students  and
Muslim outfits. He recalls that “the Action Committee was there but since it was packed
with Muslim political outfits…[he] kept a distance from Muslim organizations” (A. M.
Khan, personal communication, March 21, 2015). Similarly, at the end of the minority
status  campaign  in  1982,  the  out-going  president  of  the  Students’  Union,  Shakeel
Ahmed Tamanna, urged his fellow students to stay away from the “net of external and
internal politicians” (beruni aur andruni siasatdanon ke jaal) whose “limited objective”
(mahdud maqsad) was to “exploit” students (AMUSU 1982:5). However, the very fact that
he had to warn his fellow students against the politicians’ “exploitation” of students
suggests that such connections did or could exist between students and politicians.
33 The Aligarh campaign allowed certain student leaders active in the protest movement
to acquire significant political capital outside University circles. Their status as AMU
student  leaders  made  them  enviable  allies  for  Muslim  religious  and  political
organizations. Despite his own reluctance towards “Muslim outfits,” Arif Mohammad
Khan recalls that these groups repeatedly tried to reach out to him while he was at the
head of the Students’ Union. According to him, “they were very keen that [he] join
them.” He adds: “why they needed me? …Because that helped them if I come there as
President of the Students’ Union, that helped them with the Muslim masses, and that
was their constituency” (A. M. Khan, personal communication, March 21, 2015).
34 This capacity to mobilize within and beyond the University could attract the attention
of non-Muslim organizations too. In 1974, Jayaprakash Narayan asked Arif Mohammad
Khan to join the Central Coordination Committee of his movement as one of its two
student  representatives.  Khan  then  joined  Congress  after  the  Emergency,  won  a
parliamentary  election  in  Kanpur  in  1980  and  later  occupied  ministerial  positions
under Congress and Janata governments, becoming Union Cabinet Minister for Energy
in 1989. At the time of the discussions on the new AMU bill (1980–81), he acted as an
unofficial intermediary between University members and government authorities to
help find a compromise between both parties (A. M. Khan, personal communication,
March 21, 2015). Even if his links with the student leadership may have later weakened,
29 the fact that he had once led AMU’s Students’ Union provided him with privileged
access to a larger political platform.
35 Another student leader to emerge during the Aligarh campaign was Javed Habib, who
became President of the Students’ Union in 1978, at a time when the Janata Party had
just come to power. As president, he organized several demonstrations in Aligarh and
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in New Delhi to put pressure on the new government to adopt a new AMU bill (Times of
India 1978b). Habib remained deeply involved in the affairs of the University even after
he withdrew from the Students’  Union. He continued to intervene in public affairs,
notably  after  the  Aligarh  riots  in  1980  (Times  of  India 1980),  and  acted  as  an
intermediary  between  students  and  Muslim  organizations  such  as  the  Majlis-e-
Mushawarat (Srivastava 1981). Unlike Arif Mohammad Khan, he never joined a formal
political party. Like Khan, though, he used his past experience and connections as a
student leader to continue to play an active role in Muslim politics. In the late 1980s,
for  instance,  he  became  a  leading  spokesman  of  the  All  India  Babri  Masjid  Action
Committee, established in 1988 to protect the religious status of the disputed mosque
(Ansari 2012).
36 These student activists emerged around the time of Emergency, when students played a
major part in the agitations against the Congress government. Indeed, many student
leaders who participated in the anti-Emergency movement went on to become senior
political figures, either in the BJP (e.g. Vijay Goel, Arun Jaitley, Sushma Swaraj) or in
left-wing opposition parties  (e.g.  Sitaram Yechury,  CPI(M))  (Clibbens 2014:301).  This
intensification of student politics in the 1970s was part of a wider phenomenon which
went beyond the scope of the Emergency. We can think of the role of student politics in
the emergence of feminist groups such as the Progressive Organization of Women in
Hyderabad or of Marxist influences in universities like JNU from the 1960s onwards
(Kumar 1999; Lalita 2008; Batabyal 2014). At AMU, few students took direct part in the
anti-Emergency movement. Yet, as mentioned above, the years just before (1972–1974)
and after the Emergency (1977–1981) corresponded to some of the most intense phases
of student mobilization in favor of minority status.
37 As the case of AMU suggests, the intensification of student politics did not necessarily
depend on the spread of radical ideas but rather on the pluralization of Indian politics.
This pluralization contributed to the development of universities as political sites, and
vice versa. On the one hand, the burgeoning discontent against the ruling Congress was
a  powerful  driver  behind  student  mobilization.  Ali  Amir  thus  recalls  that  “anti-
Congress  opposition always  took place  in  Students’  Union’,  even more  so  after  the
Emergency” (A. Amir, personal communication, March 13, 2014).30 On the other hand,
increasing  political  competition  encouraged  parties  and  political  leaders  to  turn
towards  students  for  support.31 This  was  the  case,  for  instance,  when  Jayaprakash
Narayan recruited Arif Mohammad Khan as a student representative for his movement,
and also when members of the AMU Action Committee encouraged student leaders to
join forces with them in the campaign for the minority status.
38 As a result of these increased connections between students and political, social and
religious organizations, AMU student politics acquired a greater significance outside
the  campus  premises.  Thanks  to  their  capacity  to  mobilize  during  the  Aligarh
campaign,  AMU  student  leaders  emerged  as  potential  interlocutors  for  Muslim
organizations as well as government authorities.
 
The Emergence of Issue-based Coalitions
39 Beyond the student body, the demand for Aligarh’s minority status served as a rallying
cry for individuals and organizations representing a variety of religious or political
positions. As such, the Aligarh campaign epitomized the emergence of a new form of
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Muslim  politics,  structured  around  issue-based  coalitions,  such  as  the  AMU  Action
Committee or the Majlis-e-Mushawarat. Even as Muslim citizens continued to vote for
parties which did not have a specific Muslim character, the growing distrust of large
sections of the Muslim population towards Congress opened up a space for this form of
Muslim politics to develop outside party structures.
40 What characterized these issue-based platforms? A loose network of individuals and
heterogeneous groups which were not continuously active, but could be re-activated
for  campaigns  on  specific  issues.  This  was  the  case  of  Majlis-e-Mushawarat,  which
sprung into  existence  as  a  collective  response  to  communal  riots  in  the  1960s  and
gained  momentum  thanks  to  the  Aligarh  campaign.  Similarly,  the  AMU  Action
Committee, started as a student body and then quickly expanded to include alumni as
well as politicians and members of Muslim organizations of different shades and hues.
After  the  decline  of  Majlis-e-Mushawarat,  this  loose  coalition  acted  as  the  main
coordinating body for the AMU campaign.  In March 1973,  its  members organized a
large-scale convention with no less than 600 delegates to demand “radical changes” in
the AMU Act. The Committee gathered behind it an eclectic group, ranging from jurists,
like Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, former member of AMU’s Court and Madras High Court
Judge, to religious leaders, like Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (Ali Miyan), the reputed head of
Nadwatul Ulama, and seasoned politicians: it was none other than Sheikh Abdullah, the
former Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, who inaugurated the 1973 convention
(Sayeed 1983:90). Again, in 1978, the Action Committee brought together an impressive
number  of  religious  and  political  figures  along  with  student  representatives:  in
addition to the individuals mentioned in the table below, “other dignitaries from UP,
Bihar, West Bengal, Delhi, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and other
states”  also  participated  in  the  meeting  (Radiance 1979).  The  demand  for  minority
status  provided  these  actors,  from  widely  divergent  political  and  ideological
backgrounds,  with  a  common  objective.  By  coordinating  the  actions  of  different
religious and political organizations, the Action Committee thus provided structure to a
movement supposed to represent a cohesive community.
 
Table 1: List of dignitaries who took part in the AMU Action Committee Meet (April 22, 1978, Delhi)
(Source: Radiance 1979).
Name Title
Mufti Atiqur Rahman President, Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat
Mohammad Zulfiqarullah President, Muslim Majlis; Union Minister of State for Finance
Mohammad Masood Khan Minister for Housing and Rehabilitation, U.P.
Sulaiman Sikander Vice-President, Majlis-e-Tameer-e-Millat
Manzoor Alam President, Muslim League, Rajasthan
Iqbal Hussain Khan President, Muslim Majlis, U.P.
Abdul Azeem Khan Representative, Jamaat-e-Islami Hind
S.M. Arif Honorary Secretary, AMU Students’ Union
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41 In  the subsequent  decades,  similar  issue-based platforms emerged,  following in the
footsteps of Majlis and the Action Committee. One can think of the All India Muslim
Personal  Law Board and the Babri  Masjid Action Committee (1986) (AIMPLB 1972)32.
These  platforms,  old  and  new,  built  upon overlapping  networks  of  individuals  and
organizations. For instance, in the 1960s, Mufti Atiqur Rahman, one of Majlis’s leading
figures and an important actor of the Action Committee, was simultaneously associated
with Jamiat Ulama and AMU’s Court as well as with two of the most famous Islamic
educational institutions in India, Deoband and Nadwatul Ulama. Similarly, in the 1970s
and 1980s,  many individuals who became pivotal  figures of  the AIMPLB had earlier
played a leading role in Majlis-e-Mushawarat and in the Aligarh campaign. This was the
case, once again, of Mufti Atiqur Rahman, as well as Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, the
head of Nadwatul Ulama. Network-oriented studies of social movements have shown
that  social  movements  not  only  draw  strength  from  existing  networks,  they  also
produce  new  ties  of  solidarity,  which  can  then  come  into  use  for  subsequent
mobilizations (Diani 1997). In much the same way, the ties that Majlis-e-Mushawarat
and the AMU Action Committee had created in the 1960s facilitated the formation of
new  issue-based  platforms  which,  like  them,  took  up  the  mission  of  representing
Muslim interests.
42 Issue-based coalitions thus became a prominent feature of Muslim politics in the post-
Nehruvian period, especially in North India, where Majlis, AIMPLB and of course the
AMU  Action  Committee  all  started.  They  offered  Muslims  a  model  of  mobilization
outside party structures. In a context where large sections of the Muslim population
expressed growing distrust towards Congress, these coalitions allowed heterogeneous
Muslim groups to stand together outside the governing party to demand recognition
for religious minority rights. At the same time, they presented an alternative to the
formation of a Muslim political party. Unlike in South India, where parties such as the
Indian Union Muslim League and the MIM appeared to be legitimate political actors,33
in  North  India,  the  former  heartland  of  Muslim  League,  memories  of  partition
hampered the formation of a new Muslim party (Kudaisya 2006). In this context, issue-
based  coalitions,  which  repeatedly  invoked  the  Constitution  to  safeguard  Muslims’
minority rights, provided Muslims with another, more legitimate framework to defend
their interests as a separate group. They formed part of a larger trend—the rise of non-
party actors  defending group rights  and interests.  One can think of  student,  caste-
based  or  women’s  movements  which  all  flourished  in  the  post-Nehruvian  period
(Nigam 2006).  Along  with  these  non-party  actors,  Muslim  coalitions  put  to  test
Congress’s  “hegemonic”  discourse  on  national  unity,  thereby  contributing  to  the
pluralization of Indian politics.
43 However,  the  strength  of  issue-based  coalitions,  i.e.  their  flexible  and  catch-all
character,  was  also  their  main  weakness.  These  loose  coalitions  were  often
characterized by a weak ideological cohesion and marred by internal rivalries. These
prevented  the  formation  of  strong  ties  of  mutual  trust  and  solidarity  (Diani 1997),
which  would  have  allowed  coalition  actors  to  build  a  stable  structure  of  Muslim
representation. The fast decline of Majlis-e-Mushawarat is a good case in point: from
the  beginning,  the  rivalries  between  Jamaat-e-Islami  and  the  Jamiat  Ulema,  visible
during the Aligarh campaign, deeply affected the cohesion of the new association and
its capacity to act in the name of all Indian Muslims (Quraishi 1971).
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44 These coalitions eventually proved to have limited political clout. During the Aligarh
campaign,  members of  Majlis-e-Mushawarat tried to take advantage of  the growing
competition between Congress and its rivals to press their demands for minority status.
In the run-up to the 1971 elections, Majlis leader A.J. Faridi negotiated with Congress
MPs  the  promise  that  AMU  would  become  a  minority  institution  in  exchange  for
Muslim  support.34 Meanwhile,  Jamiat  Ulema  published  pamphlets warning  the
government that “there will be great disappointment, frustration and dissatisfaction
among the members of the minority and in the country” if the government were to
ignore this demand (Madani 1972:5). Yet, Congress and later the Janata-led government
repeatedly failed to keep their promise, despite the ongoing mobilization of students
and Muslim organizations. It was only in 1981, after the Emergency and after the first
defeat of Congress at the national level, that Parliament adopted an Act which satisfied
the  campaign’s  supporters.  This  long  delay  shows  the  limited  capacity  of  Muslim
organizations to exert influence over political parties, despite their pressure tactics.
These coalitions further failed to build a stable Muslim constituency of their own. A.J.
Faridi’s attempts, in 1969, to transform Majlis’s UP branch into a political party, met
with limited success. Muslim Majlis won but a couple of seats in the state elections, that
too on independent tickets (Khan 1980).  Issue-based platforms such as Majlis or the
AMU Action Committee therefore emerged as an alternative to both Congress and to
Muslim party politics, but as a weak alternative, only able to mobilize punctually, on
issues with a strong emotional appeal.
 
Conclusion
45 The Aligarh campaign, which took off soon after Nehru’s death, played a key role in the
reconfiguration of Muslim politics in the post-Nehruvian period. By bringing together a
wide range of actors—students, religious organizations and Muslim politicians, in the
defense of a common cause—the recognition of AMU’s minority status, it crystallized
the resurgence of the demand for minority rights and facilitated the formation of issue-
based coalitions speaking in the name of Muslim interests.
46 This form of Muslim minority politics needs not be regarded primarily as a symptom of
sectarian tendencies let loose by the erosion of the Nehruvian consensus. Movements
such  as  the  campaign  for  Aligarh’s  minority  status  arose  largely  as  a  response  to
Congress’s failure, after independence, to ensure that Muslims would be treated as full-
fledged citizens in the new nation-state. By putting emphasis on Muslims’ group rights,
these minority politics contributed, more largely, to the pluralization of Indian politics
as  they questioned,  along with low-caste  movements  or  other  “infra-nationalisms,”
Congress’s hegemonic discourse on national unity (Nigam 2006:86).
47 However,  the  emergence  of  these  “little  selves”  could  also  facilitate  the  growth of
majoritarian tendencies (Nigam 2006). Indeed, the rise of the Hindu right in the 1980s
both fueled the calls for Muslims’ protection and fed itself upon this type of minority
politics:  the  increased  emphasis  on  minority  identity  lent  credence  to  their
majoritarian rhetoric, which portrayed Muslims as the internal other.
48 This may explain why, in parallel to issue-based platforms defending minority rights,
alternative voices emerged among Muslims, which either challenged or ignored this
type of minority politics. One may think of radical student movements like SIMI or of
the Pasmanda movement in the 1990s, which shared a deep dissatisfaction with the
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established Muslim leadership, too narrowly focused on minority issues.35 Similarly, in
the  post-Babri  Masjid  period,  some  scholars  and  educationists  urged  their  co-
religionists to turn away from “emotional” issues to focus instead on education in order
to address Muslims’ “real” issues, i.e. socio-economic backwardness (Gautier 2016:161–
214).
49 There  again,  universities,  especially  AMU,  appeared  as  privileged  sites  for  the
emergence  of  alternative  strategies.  SIMI  first  emerged  at  Aligarh  during  the
Emergency  as  students  associated  with  Jamaat-e-Islami  aspired  to  emancipate
themselves from their elders (Ahmad 2005:2010). In the 1990s, a few students formed
the  Forum  for  Democratic  Rights  with  the  aim  of  reorienting  Muslims’  attention
towards socio-economic uplift. According to Mohammad Sajjad, a former member of
this group, their objective was to promote a “new brand of Muslim politics” within a
“secular  democratic  order”  (Sajjad 2014).  Meanwhile,  some  of  AMU’s  key
administrative figures, like Vice-Chancellor Syed Hamid, tried to revive a new Aligarh
movement which would focus on backward Muslims’ socio-economic uplift rather than
religious and cultural issues (Gautier 2016:173–4, 207). Thus, even after the end of the
campaign for the minority status,  AMU remained a laboratory for diverse forms of
Muslim politics, with an aim to reach out to the Muslim community, much beyond the
University’s premises.
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NOTES
1. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898),  also known as Sir  Syed,  was one of  the most prominent
Muslim modernist reformers of British India. He was a prolific scholar as well as an institution-
builder who established a number of educational, scientific and literary institutions including,
most  famously,  the  Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental  College  (1877),  which later  became Aligarh
Muslim University (1920). See Lelyveld 1978; and Saikia and Rahman 2019.
2. In South Asia, this term designates Muslim families who claimed foreign descent, whether
Arab, Turkish, Persian or Afghan. These families usually benefit from a higher social status than
descendants of Indian converts.
3. Article 30 of the Constitution grants religious and linguistic minorities the right to "establish
and  administer  educational  institutions  of  their  choice."  The  managing  bodies  of  minority
institutions benefit from greater autonomy: they are not subjected to the same rules as other
state-controlled institutions (e.g.  they need not implement "backward" quotas)  and they can
adopt institution-specific regulations (e.g. religious instruction, minority quotas for admission).
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4. To defend these arguments, I rely on a range of sources produced by different sections of AMU:
official university publications, such as the Muslim University Gazette, Vice-Chancellors’ writings,
as  well  as  speeches  from  Students’  Union  representatives.  I  also  conducted  semi-structured
interviews with former students, many of whom participated in student politics in the 1960s and
1970s. The private papers of Education Minister M.C. Chagla have proven to be a very rich source
to explore the relations between the government and University members as well as the role of
"outsiders,"  especially  religious  organizations  such as  Majlis-e-Mushawarat.  I  have  also  used
some of these religious organizations’ pamphlets as well newspaper articles in the English and
Urdu press to get as comprehensive as possible a picture of the Aligarh agitation inside and
outside the University.
5. This is an expression attributed to Jinnah.
6. The Republican Party of India was established in 1957, shortly after Ambedkar’s death. The
party bore the stamp of his influence: instead of focusing on Scheduled Castes alone, the RPI was
to build alliances with the other "downtrodden masses of India," including Scheduled Tribes and
other Backward Classes’ (Jaffrelot 2003, p.106–7).
7. Internal students were students who had already joined AMU, either at high school or college
level.
8. To  increase  internal  quotas  was  nothing  revolutionary.  In  1961,  the  Chatterji  Committee,
appointed by the government, had already recommended similar measures to ensure that "the
bulk  of  the  overall  student  population  of  the  University  should  come  from  the  Muslim
community…without fixation of any communal quotas" (AMU 1961, p.140).
9. For the Chatterji Committee, communal quotas were "open to grave objection for it would
have  been contrary  to  the  liberal  ideals  which  must  inspire  a  temple  of  learning  such as  a
university." Like the University Education Commission (1948),  it  endorsed the idea that these
quotas represented a "danger of disunion" for the country, which ran counter to universities’
role to promote national unity (AMU 1961, p.114–5).
10. In  1958,  for  instance,  the  authorities  of  Benaras  Hindu  University  closed  the  university
following  demonstrations  and  fights  between  what  Altbach (1968) describes  as  "warring
factions." In 1963,  students at  Allahabad University further used physical  threat to force the
Vice-Chancellor to re-admit some students (Di Bona 1969).
11. M.C. Chagla to Syed Mahmud. May 20, 1965 in NMML.
12. For instance, Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, member of the University Court, was arrested. He was
accused of being one of the main architects of the incident (Khalilullah to M.C. Chagla. August 13,
1965 in NMML, 80). In his letter to Chagla, dated August 17, 1965, Basheer Ahmed Sayeed denied
these charges and argued that he had tried to appease the students. According to him, students
affiliated with the Jan Sangh, the Jamiat and with communists played the leading role in the
agitation against the Vice-Chancellor (NMML, 80).
13. “Aligarh boys’ plea for pardon.” 1965. Patriot, August 7 in NMML.
14. “Vice-Chancellor’s address to Staff Association,” August 29, 1965 in Jung.
15. “Presidential Address at the All India Muslim Convention,” June 10, 1961, in Mahmud.
16. Jamiat Ulama, a religious organization which was established in 1919, played a key role in the
anti-colonial  protests  during  the  Khilafat  movement,  side  by  side  with  Congress.  In  1947,  a
majority  –  not  all  –  of  its  members  opposed  partition  and  the  Muslim  League,  hence  its
"nationalist"  tag.  After  independence,  Congress  maintained  close  ties  with  the  organisation,
which they regarded as a representative of Muslims’ voices in India.
17. Jamaat-e-Islami was founded in 1941 by Maulana Maududi to transform post-colonial India
into an Islamic state. After partition, the Islamist organization split into two Pakistani and Indian
branches. The latter one, Jamaat-e-Islami-e-Hind, progressively gave up its isolationist strategy
to join democratic politics.
18. 1965. Dawat, July 24, p.3, in NMML.
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19. “Convention  leader  pleads  for  Muslim  management.”  1965.  Hindustan  Times,  August  4;
“Aligarh old boys to have panel for ‘peaceful action’.” 1965. Hindustan Times, August 9, p.1; 1965.
Dawat, July 20, in NMML.
20. In M.C. Chagla’s papers on the AMU campaign, we can find press clippings from the Urdu
press in Delhi (Havat,  a communist weekly, Al Jamiat and Dawat,  published respectively by the
Jamiat Ulama and the Jamaat-e-Islami, Pratap, a pro Jan Sangh newspaper, Savera and Daur-e-
Jadeed), from Lucknow (Qaumi Awaz), Kanpur (Siasat), Ptna (Sangam, Sada-e-Aam), but also from
Hyderabad (Rahnuma-e-Deccan),  Calcutta (Azad Hind,  Rozana Hind),  Bombay (Hindustan,  Inquilab)
and Calicut (Chandrika). In addition, one finds press clippings from the English press based in
Delhi (Hindustan Times, Patriot, Hindustan Standard, Link, Indian Express) and Bombay (Times of India,
Blitz).
21. “Aligarh Old Boys to Have Panel for ‘Peaceful Action.’” 1965. Hindustan Times, August, 9 in
NMML.
22. Radiance. 1965. June 20, p.4, cited in Wright 1966a.
23. In  an  article  entitled  “Running of  Aligarh Varsity  Exclusively  by  Muslims Demanded,”  a
journalist  shows  the  identity  of  demands  between  Majlis’s  memorandum  and  a  resolution
adopted by Jamaat-e-Islami (1965. Times of India, July 11 in NMML).
24. Some students, teachers, and alumni distanced themselves from the AMU campaign. During
the Lucknow Convention, several alumni denounced the attempts of Jamaat-i-Islami to take over
"their" convention and to impose a "communal" line upon the movement. Some alumni directly
challenged Jamaat’s main demands. For instance, S.M. Tonki, an Old Boy of Gandhian persuasion,
tried  in  vain  to  amend  the  resolution  that  demanded  an  exclusively  Muslim  control  of  the
University.  Together  with  other  Old  Boys,  he  signed  a  statement  of  dissent  denouncing  the
"unfortunate alliance" of some veterans of the nationalist movement (they were referring here
to Syed Mahmud) with the "reactionary, narrow-minded and sectarian elements" of the Jamaat-
e-Islami. “Threats on Aligarh.” 1965. Patriot, August 9 in NMML.
25. Akhtarul  Wasey  recalls  that  the  University  was  closed  several  times  in  1972 –73  due  to
students’  mobilization  against  the  "Black  Act."  He  himself  was  arrested,  along  with  a  few
politicians,  like  A.J.  Faridi,  who  supported  the  protests  (A.  Wasey,  personal  communication,
November 7, 2013). See also press reports such as Wasey 1972 and Times of India 1972b.
26. See the regular articles published in Times of India and Radiance during that period.
27. Nigam (2006, p.320–3) adopts here Partha Chatterjee’s famous distinction between "civil" and
"political" society.
28. This was the name of AMU alumni’s association.
29. This is what Salman Khurshid suggests (2015, p.170–1).
30. See also the joint statement published in November 1978 by a group of students and teachers
to  support  Janata  Party’s  “secular  and  democratic  forces”  against  Indira  Gandhi’s
“authoritarianism and fascism” (Times of India 1978a).
31. Patrick Clibbens points out that the recruitment strategies of left and right-wing opposition
parties relied in large measure on “channeling the enthusiasms of the young,” particularly of the
“burgeoning” urban youth, more inclined towards “radical” ideas (2014, p.194–5).
32. On the AIMPLB, see Jones 2010. On the BMAC, see Ahmed 2014, p.229–30.
33. On the Muslim League in Kerala, see Wright 1966b. On the Majlis-i-Ittehadul-Muslimeen in
Hyderabad, see Alam 1993.
34. Cyclostyled document dated 4 July 1972 distributed by Dr. A.J. Faridi. Excerpts reproduced in
Noorani 2003, p.360–1.
35. For Ahmad, the formation of SIMI epitomized the emergence of a new "Islamist class," ready
to challenge the authority of elders (2010). For a critique of Muslim minority politics by a SIMI
supporter, see Ali 1982. On the Pasmanda movement as a call to the "democratization" of Indian
Muslims, see for instance Alam 2003.
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ABSTRACTS
This article focuses on the campaign for AMU’s minority status (1965–1981), at the intersection of
student politics and Muslim politics. What started in 1965 as an internal university dispute on
student  quotas  soon  transformed  into  a  central  Muslim  issue.  The  campaign  crystallized
mounting  resentment  against  the  government  and  provided  a  common  platform  to
heterogeneous forces–students, teachers, as well as Muslim organizations of different shades and
hues–who all claimed to serve Muslim interests. This campaign thus played a key role in the
reconfiguration  of  Muslim  politics  in  the  1960s.  It  contributed  to  the  re-emergence  of  the
demand for Muslim minority rights, largely delegitimized after partition. It provided a platform
for  an  increasingly  assertive  Muslim  leadership  which  claimed  to  represent  the  Muslim
community. Finally, it constituted a laboratory for issue-based coalitions, which, in the absence
of a strong Muslim political party, became a dominant feature of Muslim politics, especially in
North India. These changes must be read in the wider context of the post-Nehruvian period. The
campaign  participated  in  the  emergence  of  counter-narratives,  which  questioned  Congress’s
“hegemonic” discourse on secular nationalism. Through student mobilization and issue-based
coalitions, it  also facilitated the emergence of contentious voices outside party structures. As
such,  the campaign participated in the larger pluralization of  Indian politics,  marked by the
erosion of Congress’s dominance, much before the post-Emergency crisis.
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